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THE ALI PRINCIPLES ON 
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY DISPUTES:  WHY INVITE 
CONFLICTS? 
Rochelle Dreyfuss∗ 
INTRODUCTION  
s those members of the innovation community who focus 
on procedural law know, the American Law Institute 
(ALI)1 is engaged in a project to facilitate litigation of intellec-
tual property disputes that cross national borders.2  The enter-
prise owes its origins to the 1999 Draft of the Convention on 
Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters, negotiated at the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law.3  By now, it 
has undergone several iterations.  Columbia University Profes-
sor Jane Ginsburg and I used the Hague material as the start-
ing point for proposing a stand-alone convention dealing not 
only with the general problems of international litigation, but 
also with issues that uniquely arise when intangible rights are 
at stake.   
Our work, which was first presented at a Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law symposium in October 2001,4 attracted the atten-
tion of the ALI.  After arranging a further presentation in April 
2002, the Institute formally adopted the project as its own.  It 
  
 ∗ Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. 
 1. The Brooklyn Law School Symposium discussion focused on Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 3, which was made available to Symposium participants in 
October 2004. 
 2. ALI PRINCIPLES—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 
(Am. Law Inst. Preliminary Draft No. 3, Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter ALI Prin-
ciples].  
 3. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted on Oct. 30, 1999, at http:// 
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_drafte.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [herein-
after Draft Hague Convention]. 
 4. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Juris-
diction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002). 
A 
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appointed us, along with François Dessemontet of the Univer-
sity of Lausanne (Switzerland), as co-Reporters, and an interna-
tional group of intellectual property lawyers, practitioners, and 
judges as Advisers of the project, entitled Intellectual Property: 
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judg-
ments in Transnational Disputes.5  Revised drafts, now cast in 
the form of principles that courts may follow, rather than as a 
convention that nations must join, were presented to the Advis-
ers in February of 2003 and 2004 and to a special session of the 
ALI membership in May 2004.  A new draft will be presented to 
the Advisers in April 2005.  It will be at least a year, probably 
longer, before the ALI will formally consider approving the final 
product.  In the meantime, the Reporters are interested in 
broad input.  Accordingly, we are grateful to Professor Sam Mu-
rumba for the valuable opportunity to discuss our work at 
Brooklyn Law School. 
The current draft differs in many ways from the one initially 
unveiled in Chicago.  Of particular importance, it goes beyond 
the issues of personal jurisdiction and enforcement of judg-
ments—the issues that were at the heart of the Hague Conven-
tion—to cover choice of law.  After explaining why a project tai-
lored to intellectual property litigation is desirable and describ-
ing its key features, this paper discusses the decision to add 
principles on applicable law and the factors that were consid-
ered in making specific choices.   
I.  THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND ITS APPLICATION TO  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A convention on enforcement of foreign judgments has been 
in gestation at the Hague Conference for over a decade.  Begun 
in 1992, the goal was to create an international analogue to the 
U.S. system of according full faith and credit to sister state 
judgments, and to the EU’s Brussels Regulation, which estab-
lishes a regime for recognizing judgments within the European 
Union.6  That is, member states were to agree to recognize and 
  
 5. A full list of participants is available on the ALI website, at 
http://www.ali.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 6. See State and Territorial Statutes and Judicial Proceedings; Full Faith 
and Credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2004); Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 
22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
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enforce any judgment rendered by another member state, so 
long as that judgment was predicated on a basis of personal ju-
risdiction approved under the convention.  Conversely, mem-
bers were to agree to refuse to recognize or enforce judgments 
predicated on jurisdictional bases prohibited by the convention.7   
Thus, the convention was to be comprised of essentially two 
parts: one would list the bases of jurisdiction that were ap-
proved or prohibited, the other would set out conditions of en-
forcement.8 
By 1999, a draft convention was promulgated, however it 
quickly ran into significant opposition.  To some extent, the 
problems were substantive: states began with very different 
approaches to adjudicatory authority and that made it difficult 
to agree on specific jurisdictional provisions.9  Other issues were 
technological: much of the drafting of the convention was com-
pleted before the advent of e-commerce.  As a result, the nego-
tiators barely considered a key source of future international 
disputes.  Mainly, however, the issue was lack of enthusiasm.  
When the convention was first proposed, there was a strong 
perception that judgments rendered in the United States were 
difficult to enforce abroad, and that as a result, successful U.S. 
litigants were shortchanged and U.S. law was arguably under-
  
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter 
Brussels Regulation]. 
 7. Unlike the Brussels Regulation, which has only white (approved) bases 
of jurisdiction and black (prohibited) bases, the Hague plan was to leave a 
grey area where members could decide for themselves whether to recognize or 
reject a judgment. 
 8. Recognition and enforcement are not the same thing.  For example, a 
judgment can be recognized for purposes of determining whether another 
action can be filed without being at a point where it can be enforced for, say, 
money damages.  However, for purposes of convenience, the terms “enforced” 
and “enforceable” will be used to cover both concepts unless specifically noted 
otherwise. 
 9. For example, EU legislation tends to emphasize institutional consid-
erations such as predictability and consumer protection, while U.S. case law, 
which looks to the due process interests of each and every litigant, yields re-
sults that are more difficult to anticipate.  See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments 
in Transnational Disputes, 2 COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L 33 (2003); Barbara S. 
Wellbery & Rufus J. Pichler, Electronic Commerce and the Proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters—Putting the Cart Before the Horse?, 5 COMPUTER UND RECHT INT’L 129 
(2001). 
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enforced.  The U.S. bar was therefore willing to engage in a 
trade-off.  It would sacrifice certain bases of jurisdiction that 
were opposed abroad (such as general doing business jurisdic-
tion and tag jurisdiction, which are viewed elsewhere as exorbi-
tant) and in exchange, enforcement of other U.S. judgments 
would become a near-certainty.10  However, by the time the 
draft convention was promulgated, that trade-off was no longer 
considered desirable.  Because the U.S. market had become ex-
tremely attractive to foreign capital investment, in most signifi-
cant cases, foreign litigants had sufficient assets within the 
United States to satisfy judgments rendered against them.  
With less need to find internationally accepted predicates for 
jurisdiction, the enthusiasm within the United States for sacri-
ficing familiar bases dissipated.  And since the United States 
tends to enforce foreign judgments, and within the EU, the 
Brussels Regulation works well, there was a similar want of 
interest abroad.   
As of this writing, the Hague Conference has suspended work 
on a general convention.  Instead, it is taking a “bottom up” ap-
proach, which contemplates that agreements dealing with spe-
cific problems of international concern will be developed and 
that as experience with these is garnered, it will become easier 
to draft a general convention governing all private law disputes.  
Thus, there is now a proposal pending at the Hague for an in-
strument on exclusive choice of court agreements.  This conven-
tion would make enforceable judgments rendered by a court 
chosen by business parties in a written contract.11  In addition, 
the Hague Conference has urged practitioners and other inter-
ested parties to consider the wisdom and contours of agree-
ments covering specific legal fields where international en-
forcement issues are particularly problematic.  
  
 10. See Draft Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 18 (d), (f), (i).  This 
would have been more of a sacrifice than might first meet the eye as even U.S. 
judgments enforced in the United States would be subject to the prohibition 
on tag and doing business jurisdiction if they involved litigants that were 
citizens of other convention states. 
 11. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Apr. 21-
27, 2004, Work. Doc. No. 110E revised, available at http://www.ejtn.net/ 
www/en/resources/5_1095_1181_file.409.pdf. 
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It can certainly be argued that intellectual property is one 
such field.  On the copyright side, markets are now global.  U.S. 
movies, television programs, and music have long enjoyed broad 
audiences abroad, and in recent years, foreign works have be-
gun to appeal to Americans.  Population shifts have produced 
diasporas—significant communities that consume works in one 
language while living in locations where another is spoken.  At 
the same time, the Internet and other forms of digital transmis-
sions have reduced the cost of reaching international markets 
and decentralized the mechanisms of distributing intellectual 
products.  Many of these factors—along with the rise in interna-
tional travel—have created a similarly global market for, and 
knowledge of, trademarks.12  As to patents, the Internet is in-
creasingly used to distribute patented software and to make 
offers to sell tangible embodiments of patented inventions to 
remote locations.13  There are also patents that are explicitly 
drawn to the online environment.  Some patents include so-
called “divided” claims, which contemplate activity in more than 
one jurisdiction.14  It is also becoming increasingly common for 
those investing in innovation to rely on fairly global exploita-
tion, especially now that there are international instruments 
that make the acquisition of world-wide protection easier.15 
  
 12. See, e.g., William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 
AM. J. COMP. L. 383 (2000) (attributing new interest in choice of law to the 
same set of phenomena). 
 13. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Litmer v. PDQUSA.com, 326 F. Supp. 2d 952 (N.D. Ind. 
2004).  See generally, Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent 
Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (claiming that utilization of the Blackberry infringes U.S. patent 
law even though networks were located in Canada). 
 15. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights broadens the base of inventors who are eligible for patents in each 
country. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Part II, § 5, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement].  The Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Convention on the Grant 
of European Patents make it cheaper for investors to take advantage of the 
TRIPS opportunity.  See Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 
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These changes put significant pressure on both the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights and on effective defenses 
against infringement claims.  A single Internet transmission 
can simultaneously produce copyright and trademark infringe-
ments on a world-wide basis.  Similarly, a business method can 
be practiced on a server situated in one country, at the instiga-
tion of users located in a multiplicity of other states.  As a re-
sult, rights holders now find that to fully protect their interests, 
they must sue in more than one jurisdiction, and shoulder the 
attendant risks of infringements occurring in places where the 
defendant lacks assets, where there are insufficient contacts to 
support adjudicatory authority, or where the law or the pace of 
legal proceedings is especially disadvantageous.  Indeed, the 
ubiquity of the Internet’s infrastructure gives the users of intel-
lectual property unprecedented ability to choose to operate from 
precisely such locations.16  And in some instances, servers can 
be artfully placed so that there is no one country where all the 
steps of a patent are practiced—and therefore, arguably, no in-
fringement anywhere.17 
The globalization of intellectual property activities and com-
munications also poses problems to potential defendants.  Lack-
ing the ability to predict when they will be subject to adjudica-
tory authority, consumers of intellectual property act at their 
peril when they utilize material protected anywhere.  Further-
  
7645, 9 I.L.M. 978; Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 
1973, 13 I.L.M. 268. 
 16. This is not meant to exclude the possibility that nonInternet cases 
could also require multiple enforcement efforts.  For an example, see Kabu-
shiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Ball, [2004] E.W.H.C. 
1738 (Ch. 2004) (Eng.), which involved the sale from the United Kingdom to 
various other countries of chips circumventing technological protections to 
certain Sony games.  Under one of the statutes in issue, only sales within the 
United Kingdom were regarded as actionable in the United Kingdom; sales 
abroad would have to be pursued elsewhere, unless foreign claims could be 
asserted in the English court under the Brussels Convention.  Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, Nov. 29, 1996, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
 17. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 
Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 100 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=628241 (discussing problems arising from patents 
written to cover modern technologies which attempt to bring the distributed 
acts of different users around the globe into the ambit of a territorial legal 
system that looks for a single infringer).  
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more, rights holders can use the necessity of successive actions 
to their advantage, to wear users down by bringing actions se-
riatim, hoping eventually to win in a big enough market to 
make the competitor’s continuing activity everywhere unprofit-
able.  This is a particular problem for small businesses that lack 
the legal and technical sophistication necessary to avoid becom-
ing amenable to suit in foreign fora and the resources to fight 
multiple suits.  To the extent that start-ups are especially re-
sponsible for innovation, these problems may significantly af-
fect the public interest by chilling creativity and technological 
progress.18 
A convention of the type originally contemplated at the 
Hague would solve many of these problems.  The Internet has 
created difficult personal jurisdiction cases for all courts, and 
these are further complicated by the intangible nature of the 
rights at issue.19  Thus, it would be quite helpful to have an in-
ternational agreement on which activities support the assertion 
of adjudicatory authority.  Further, courts have taken different 
positions on their power to rectify and to stop (on both a perma-
nent and temporary basis) injuries that occur outside their ter-
ritories.20  Clarity on that issue would thus also be welcome.  
  
 18. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 369–71 (2d Cir. 
1997) (successive suits for infringing trade secrets brought in the United 
States and France not barred by res judicata). 
 19. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (setting out an early test for jurisdiction based on Inter-
net transactions); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, 
Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing later cases).  For state 
court cases, see, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 58 
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  For an 
example of a foreign court grappling with similar issues see Dow Jones & Co. 
v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).  See generally Allan R. Stein, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of 
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (2004). 
 20. For example, in the United States, the single-publication rule, which 
requires the assertion of all claims for libel in a single action, is said to protect 
the interests of the media, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 
777 (1984);  arguably a similar rule should protect media defendants in intel-
lectual property actions.  By contrast, however, the EU bars the assertion of 
extraterritorial libel claims in courts that are not situated at the residence of 
the defendant.  See Shevill v. Presse Alliance S.A., [1995] 2 A.C. 18 (H.L. 
1995) (Eng.).  There is similar controversy over cross-border relief issues.  See, 
e.g., Turner v. Grovit, 1 All. E.R. 960 (H.L. 2002) (Eng.); Grupo Mexicano de 
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Symposium, 
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But even more is possible.  A convention tailored to the needs of 
the intellectual property community could also make the adju-
dication of international infringements efficient.  It could facili-
tate cooperation among courts entertaining parts of the same 
series of transactions or create avenues for consolidating cases, 
thereby saving judicial resources on a world-wide basis.  It 
would also reduce the private cost of enforcing intellectual 
property rights and improve the deterrent effect of the law.  At 
the same time, an integrated system would prevent plaintiffs 
from harassing lawful users, safeguard free speech interests, 
and assure that materials in the public domain are genuinely 
available for use. 
Admittedly, the ALI cannot fulfill all of these goals.  Because 
the drafters do not represent states, its provisions will not be 
enacted directly into law.  However, as a set of principles, the 
project can demonstrate how national courts could be used to 
create an efficient method for adjudicating international dis-
putes. Thus, the hope is that states will be inspired to return to 
the bargaining table, where they can use the work as a tem-
plate for action.  The Principles can also have an impact as “soft 
law.”  In some cases, they could be followed by courts unilater-
ally or adopted through the consent of the parties—in their con-
tract or at the time of litigation.  A set of principles also creates 
a focus for future discussion by the intellectual property com-
munity.  Indeed, it is heartening to see that similar projects are 
proceeding in other arenas.21 
  
Copyright's Long Arm: Enforcing U.S. Copyrights Abroad, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 
REV. 45 (2004); John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention 
for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 83, 85 (2002). 
 21. The International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty [hereinafter AIPPI] has polled its membership on these issues and has 
adopted a Resolution proposing approaches to jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
enforcement of judgments that are generally consistent with the ALI Princi-
ples.  See AIPPI, Report Q174: Jurisdiction and applicable law in the case of 
cross-border infringement (infringing acts) of intellectual property rights, 
AIPPI 2003 Y.B., at 827, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/resol 
utions/Q174_E.pdf.  There is also a group of intellectual property lawyers in 
Europe, led by the Max Planck Institute, working on an International Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, which deals with 
many of the same issues.  Its principal author, Annette Kur, is an advisor on 
the ALI project. 
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II. THE ALI PROJECT 
Given this background, the contours of the ALI project are 
largely predictable.  After defining the areas of intellectual 
property law to which the Principles will apply, the issues dealt 
with at the Hague are addressed.  First, the jurisdictional pro-
visions specify the sort of contacts a defendant must have with 
a state to become amenable to suit in its courts.  These provi-
sions also delimit the scope of the court’s authority to hear and 
act upon claims arising within and without its territory.  Sec-
ond, the Principles set out rules on when, and on what terms, 
judgments based on these bases of jurisdiction should be en-
forced.  However, the project also departs from the Hague ap-
proach in significant ways.  It includes procedures for simplify-
ing the adjudication of world-wide disputes, providing two 
methods, cooperation and consolidation.  Further, as described 
more fully in the next section, it lays out criteria for determin-
ing the law to be applied in international contexts. 
A. Scope   
The Principles apply to all intellectual property rights, in-
cluding not only copyright, patents, and trademarks, but also 
neighboring rights, trade secrets, domain names and rights 
stemming from concepts of unfair competition.  The notion is to 
cast a broad net, so that courts enjoy maximum flexibility to 
structure litigation in ways that encourage efficiency.  However, 
it is recognized that drawing lines can be difficult.  Accordingly, 
it is contemplated that early in the litigation process, the court, 
helped by the parties, will determine whether, and to what ex-
tent, the Principles will apply. 
B. Jurisdiction   
As is standard in American jurisprudence, the Principles dis-
tinguish between bases of general and specific jurisdiction.  A 
third type of jurisdiction, designed to improve efficiency, has 
also been added.  Because the ALI project sets out multiple 
bases of adjudicatory authority but does not establish a prefer-
ence among them, it differs sharply from the 1999 Draft Hague 
Convention and also from European practice.  However, this 
approach was considered necessary to achieve the project’s 
overall goal: a multiplicity of jurisdictional predicates creates 
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the flexibility needed to situate each case in the court best able 
to provide complete justice to all the litigants.  Nonetheless, it is 
also understood that one of the attractions of a set of Principles 
is that it can provide some assurance that jurisdiction will not 
be asserted inappropriately.  Thus, the project does not opt for 
complete flexibility.  Instead, it follows the Hague approach by 
defining certain bases of jurisdiction as prohibited.22 
1. General Jurisdiction   
The two provisions on general jurisdiction create authority to 
hear all claims against a defendant no matter where they arise.  
Both should be familiar to American lawyers: the defendant is 
subject to general jurisdiction at its habitual residence (domi-
cile) and in any court where a general appearance is made.  
Thus, a defendant whose habitual residence is Germany, who 
engages in activity in France and Germany that leads to harm 
in France, Germany, the United States, and Japan, can be sued 
in Germany for the harm claimed in all four states.  A general 
appearance in a court of any of the other countries will similarly 
create jurisdiction over claims to harm everywhere. 
2. Specific Jurisdiction   
Unlike the general jurisdiction provisions, which are based 
entirely on general law, the three principles that deal with spe-
cific jurisdiction take into account the special needs of the intel-
lectual property community. 
The first provision (which in a sense lies midway between 
general and specific jurisdiction), expresses a position in favor 
of party autonomy.  It makes defendants amenable to suit in 
any place agreed to in a choice of forum clause.23  Some of the 
language in the current draft is essentially a placeholder for 
  
 22. As with the Draft Hague Convention, there is a residual grey area 
where every state has authority to make its own decisions on enforcement. 
 23. This has the flavor of general jurisdiction because the claims need not 
arise from the contract directly.  See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585 (1991) (recognizing the enforceability of a forum selection clause 
in a consumer contract in a torts case for negligent operation of a vessel).  
However, unless the contract was badly drafted, the amenability to suit would 
be restricted to claims arising from the relationship created by the contract 
containing the forum selection clause. 
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changes that will likely be made to conform the Principles to 
the choice of forum convention currently under negotiation at 
the Hague.  However, there is also language that will not likely 
be conformed to the new Hague instrument because it is in-
tended to tailor the law to intellectual property transactions.  In 
these transactions, there is a clear need for agreements that 
reduce the jurisdictional exposure of distributors of digitized 
information, but also a concern that nonnegotiated licenses 
(clickwraps and shrinkwraps) will overreach and require adju-
dication in a forum which is burdensome to the other side (and 
which applies law recognizing the enforceability of choice of fo-
rum agreements24).   
To deal with this problem, the Principles reject the Hague’s 
distinction between consumer and business transactions, and 
instead differentiate between negotiated and nonnegotiated li-
censes.  Judgments based on forum selection clauses in all ne-
gotiated agreements are enforceable, even when individuals are 
involved.  However, for nonnegotiated agreements, forum selec-
tion clauses will be effective only if the forum chosen is reason-
able under rules set out by the Principles themselves (as distin-
guished from the place where enforcement of the agreement is 
sought).  If the agreement is reasonable when judged in light of 
the expectations, location, sophistication, and resources of the 
parties, in particular the weaker party, the interests of the 
relevant states, the availability of online dispute resolution, and 
the expertise of the court chosen, the forum selection will be 
honored; otherwise, it will be disregarded.  In the end, the hope 
is that the risk of losing the benefits of forum selection clauses 
will encourage those who draft nonnegotiated agreements to 
make fair choices. 
A second provision covers contract actions generally (that is, 
claims arising from contracts that do not contain enforceable 
forum selection clauses).  This provision gives the courts of a 
state whose rights are in issue adjudicatory authority over the 
defendant.  However, the court’s power is limited to local 
  
 24. Currently, courts tend to use forum law to decide whether to enforce 
forum selection clauses, with the result that it is difficult to predict when they 
will be enforced and to know whether the nondrafting party will be suffi-
ciently protected.  See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Neder-
land N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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claims.  For example, a dispute over an agreement licensing 
world-wide trademark rights can be litigated in France, even if 
the defendant is not a domiciliary of France—but the only 
claims that can be adjudicated are those that deal with the 
French marks.  As with forum selection clauses, this provision 
can be used for nonnegotiated agreements only when the con-
tract is reasonable under criteria set out in the Principles. 
The third head of specific jurisdiction involves one of the most 
controversial issues addressed by the Principles: jurisdiction 
over infringement actions.  In a variation on the traditional ap-
proach in the United States, this provision creates a sliding 
scale, with the level of adjudicatory authority dependent on the 
nature of the forum state’s connection with the dispute.  
When the defendant has “substantially acted” in the state, 
the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant extends to all claims 
of harm arising out of the defendant’s in-state activity, no mat-
ter where the harm is felt.  For example, a defendant who is 
habitually resident in Germany, who operates a server in An-
gola, where the plaintiff is habitually resident, and who uses 
that server to distribute infringing content to Portugal, Brazil, 
and Mozambique will be amenable to suit in Angola for all 
claims arising out of the activity in Angola, including claims 
pertaining to harm in Portugal, Brazil, and Mozambique.   
When there is less connection to the state, the court’s author-
ity is more circumscribed and the ambit of the case is deter-
mined by whether the plaintiff is bringing the case in the forum 
where it is resident.  It has, however, proved difficult to draw 
the line between activity that occurs as a result of the defen-
dant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s benefits and activity 
that results from the unilateral actions of others.  In the former 
situation, there is universal sentiment that jurisdiction is justi-
fied, whereas in the latter, there is a sense that asserting juris-
diction is inappropriate.  In part, the problem is linguistic, for it 
is hard to describe what the defendant must be doing to be 
amenable to jurisdiction without involving the court in difficult 
determinations of intent.  Various formulations have been con-
sidered, including “directing activity,” “targeting the jurisdic-
tion,” and “endeavoring to direct.” 
To a large extent, however, the problem is normative.  It re-
volves around questions of how much responsibility actors 
should bear to avoid jurisdictions in which they do not wish to 
be sued and whether it is reasonable to require the same avoid-
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ance activities of all intellectual property users, no matter their 
size, wealth, and degree of technological and legal sophistica-
tion.  For example, it is fairly clear that a German domiciliary 
who runs a website in Angola in the Portuguese language, 
which makes available music that appeals specifically to a Por-
tuguese audience, should be subject to jurisdiction in Brazil for 
harm occurring there.  It is less clear that this defendant should 
also be subject to jurisdiction in New York where, unknown to 
the defendant, there is a substantial diaspora of Portuguese 
speakers who migrated from Madeira and who found the web-
site on its own.   
In the current draft, a conservative approach is taken.  The 
court where the action is filed must scrutinize the defendant’s 
activities to determine whether it is reasonable to believe it was 
directing the alleged infringement to the state.  Since “direct-
ing” is defined as initiating or maintaining “contacts, business, 
or an audience ... on a regular basis,” businesses with sporadic 
contacts will not be amenable to the court’s power.  Further-
more, the defendant is given an opportunity to avoid the court’s 
authority by demonstrating that it took steps reasonable under 
the circumstances to avoid acting in the state.  If the defendant 
is found to have directed infringement towards a state, then a 
plaintiff who is a resident of that state, may assert claims for all 
the harm resulting from the defendant’s activity, no matter 
where that harm actually occurred.  If the plaintiff is not a state 
resident, then only local harm may be asserted.   
3. Jurisdiction for Simplification   
The remaining two bases of jurisdiction are designed to facili-
tate efficient adjudication.  These grounds of jurisdiction may 
be unfamiliar to Americans, but they are based on the Brussels 
Regulation and are thus known to Europeans.25  The first provi-
sion would expand the authority of the court where one defen-
dant is habitually resident to include power over other defen-
dants who are enmeshed in the same transactions.  It applies 
only when the other nonresident defendants have some contact 
with the forum state and separate adjudication of claims 
against the various defendants would create a risk that the par-
  
 25. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 6, art. 6(1)–(2). 
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ties will be subject to inconsistent outcomes.26  In such cases, 
the scope of the lawsuit extends to all harms flowing from the 
joint activity, no matter where it occurs.  The second provision 
pertains to third-party actions, and allows a local defendant to 
add parties who are liable to the defendant for all or part of the 
judgment the defendant suffers.  Again, the court’s power ex-
tends to harm flowing from the alleged activity, no matter 
where it occurs. 
4. Prohibited Bases of Jurisdiction   
Finally, as with the Draft Hague Convention, the Principles 
list a series of bases that are considered inappropriate predi-
cates for adjudicatory authority.  These include jurisdiction 
based solely on nationality, temporary residence or presence, or 
service of process within the territory. 
C. Subject Matter Authority    
Consistent with U.S. law, the Principles draw a distinction 
between subject matter and personal jurisdiction.  Local law 
supplies the rules on subject matter authority.  However, to 
achieve efficiency, the Principles suggest that where possible 
under local law, and consistent with the scope of personal juris-
diction set out in the Principles, courts should extend their sub-
ject matter reach to cover all claims and counterclaims arising 
from the transaction that gave rise to the initial claims.  Al-
though there have been suggestions that efficiency should be 
forced on the parties by making related claims and counter-
claims compulsory, the absence of well-developed doctrines of 
claim and issue preclusion in some parts of the world militate 
against that approach. 
In addition, the Principles contemplate that courts will exer-
cise their authority to hear declaratory judgment actions and to 
provide provisional relief.  In the latter case, the Principles sug-
gest that the court hearing the action exercise its competence to 
  
 26. Cf. Expandable Grafts P’ship v. Boston Scientific, B.V., Court of Appeal 
of the Hague (1999) F.S.R. 352, ¶ 19 (consolidating cases when the defendants 
are part of the same group of companies).  The Principles recognize three 
types of inconsistency: redundant liability, judgments that undermine one 
another, and judgments to which the parties cannot simultaneously conform 
their behavior. 
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issue any protective order necessary, including those that cross 
national borders.  Other courts are to limit their power to issue 
preliminary measures to actions that affect only their own terri-
tories. 
D. Simplification   
As noted earlier, a key value of this project is its capacity to 
facilitate resolution of global disputes.  The Principles offer two 
methods for simplifying such disputes, cooperation and consoli-
dation, both of which draw on American and European methods 
of aggregation.27  Both are thought to require some degree of 
supervision; the Principles use the lis pendens doctrine to 
choose the supervisor.  Under this provision (and subject to an 
exception explained below), initial decisions on simplification 
are to be made by the court where the first of the related ac-
tions is filed (the court with “supervisory authority”).  These 
decisions include whether to simplify, the method of simplifica-
tion, and in the case of consolidation, the place of simplification.  
Since these decisions can be opportunities for delay, there are 
also provisions aimed at minimizing dilatory practices. 
1. Whether  
Initially, the court must decide whether the world-wide ac-
tions are closely enough connected to benefit from coordinated 
treatment.  It is expected that such will be the case whenever 
two or more lawsuits in different countries arise from connected 
transactions. 
2. How  
The decision on how to simplify involves a choice between co-
operation and consolidation.  The Principles set out criteria for 
making this selection.  These include such matters as whether 
there is a court with sufficient power over all of the litigants 
and enough authority to award the relief requested to make 
consolidation an option; whether there is a court with special 
expertise in the issues in contention; the impact of the decision 
  
 27. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (change of venue); Brussels Regulation, 
supra note 6, art. 27–28 (lis pendens and stays of related actions); Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens). 
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on the resources of the parties; and the degree of cooperation 
that can be expected.   
The cooperative approach is inspired by recent developments 
in international bankruptcy litigation, where the parties, with 
the aid of the courts where bankruptcy petitions are pending, 
develop a cooperative plan to coordinate the distribution of 
world-wide assets.28  Although intellectual property disputes are 
significantly different from bankruptcy in that they are not 
zero-sum games, the litigants still have substantial incentives 
to cooperate.  For example, cooperation will likely be appropri-
ate in registered rights cases, particularly patent cases, where 
the laws are very different, and foreign (and in some cases, do-
mestic) courts lack the capacity to order a patent office to act on 
a finding of invalidity.  In such cases, litigation is best situated 
in each country in which rights are registered.  At the same 
time, however, substantial benefits could be achieved if, before 
any trial commences, the parties agree to rely on a single ex-
amination of the inventor, choose to focus their disputes on the 
same embodiments of the accused device, and stipulate to the 
documents and practices that constitute the prior art.  Although 
courts could still arrive at different decisions on validity or in-
fringement, there is no real inconsistency because the laws ap-
plied are different and, in many cases, exploitation in one terri-
tory is (at least in theory) unaffected by exploitation else-
where.29 
  
 28. See, e.g., American Law Institute, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: 
COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003) (attempting to develop 
such a method for managing bankruptcy within NAFTA countries), available 
at http://www.ali.org/ali/trans-insolv.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2005); 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT (United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1997), 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvencyindex.htm; Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 567 
(2003); Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 31 (2001). 
 29. In practice this may not be so.  Although the problem is not as dra-
matic as inconsistent judgments about whether a work can be distributed on 
the Internet, in fact, prohibiting the sale of patented articles in one jurisdic-
tion can affect decisions on exploitation elsewhere because of factors such as 
economies in the scale of production and the demand for interoperable prod-
ucts.  
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In contrast, copyright cases involving Internet distribution 
may be better suited to the other approach, consolidation of all 
cases arising from a series of transactions in a single forum.  In 
such cases, there are real risks that conflicting judgments will 
be entered—for instance, that one court will consider a trans-
mission infringing while another court holds the same trans-
mission noninfringing; or that more than one court will levy 
royalties on the identical communication.30  Resources can be 
saved and inconsistency avoided if all cases are transferred to a 
single court, which can then determine how best to deal with 
the interests of the states involved.31 
3. Where 
If the court decides on cooperation, then it will develop a plan 
for adjudicating the world-wide dispute with input from the 
parties and the other courts involved.  On the other hand, when 
a court decides to consolidate, then it must next select the place 
where the action will be heard.  If the parties’ contracts selected 
a unique forum, it will likely be chosen (subject to the usual ca-
veat on nonnegotiated agreements).  However, the goal is to 
situate the case in the court most closely connected to the par-
ties and dispute, and most convenient to the witnesses.  Prefer-
ence is also given to a tribunal specialized in the field at issue 
(for example, a specialized patent court for a case involving only 
patent issues) and to a court in a state that belongs to the WTO 
and is therefore internationally accountable for its actions.  
  
 30. Two situations raising the problem of inconsistency are presented in 
the Grokster and iCraveTV litigation, where the defendants could easily have 
been exonerated in one country (for example, the Netherlands or Canada), 
while found liable in another (such as the United States).  See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831 (W.D.Pa. 2000).  For a case raising the poten-
tial for stacking royalties, see Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publish-
ers of Canada v. Canadian Ass’n. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 
(Can.). 
 31. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National 
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000). 
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4. Dilatory Practices  
It has been suggested that the coordination approach, while 
valuable in theory, is vulnerable in practice because it provides 
infringers with multiple opportunities to engage in sharp prac-
tice and to delay adjudication.  The Principles deal with these 
concerns in several ways.  The decision to coordinate adjudica-
tion must be made early in the proceedings; if a decision is 
made not to coordinate or no decision at all is made, then each 
action can proceed where initially filed.  Furthermore, no court 
is stripped of its authority.  This is clearly the case under the 
cooperative approach; it is also true of consolidation because 
once a decision to consolidate is made, other courts suspend ac-
tivity—they do not dismiss.  If the consolidated case does not 
proceed in a reasonable time, then the individual actions can go 
forward.  In addition, there is an important exception to the lis 
pendens rule: the court where a declaratory judgment action is 
filed is not treated as the court with supervisory authority.  In-
stead, an intellectual property holder can file a coercive suit 
that, essentially, vetoes any attempt by the defendant to use a 
“torpedo action” (a declaration for a finding of noninfringement 
or invalidity filed in a court known for delay32) to postpone ad-
judication.   
To put this another way, the Principles improve upon the 
current system because the power to transfer cases carries with 
it the ability to choose a court that is expert and speedy.  More-
over, the system as a whole reduces sharp practices by eliminat-
ing the benefits of forum shopping.  Because there are many 
places where defendants are subject to adjudicatory authority, 
there is little advantage in situating activities or bringing de-
claratory actions in “information havens.”  By the same token, 
plaintiffs may not receive much benefit from suing in “informa-
tion hells” because such cases are subject to transfer to a more 
  
 32. For further discussion, see Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdic-
tional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business Transactions: 
the U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327, 344–45 (2004); Trevor C. Hartley, 
How to Abuse the Law And (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith Proceedings 
Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, 
73–81 (James A. R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002). 
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appropriate forum.  As explained more fully below, control over 
applicable law further reduces the effects of forum shopping. 
E. Enforcement   
Although one of the ultimate goals of the project is to create a 
platform for enforcing judgments, this section has yet to receive 
focused attention by the Reporters or by their Advisers.  To a 
significant extent, the current language is a placeholder.  As 
much as possible, it will be conformed to any instrument that 
the Hague succeeds in promulgating.  Even more important, the 
American Law Institute will likely expect the Principles to 
agree generally with its own Project on Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal 
Statute.  This work, which was formerly entitled the Interna-
tional Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, has been under con-
sideration at the ALI for several years.  It sets out uniform cri-
teria for determining the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in the United States; this Project is to be readied for 
adoption by the Institute in May 2005. 
However, a few features of the current draft will probably en-
dure.  First, the Principles give the court where enforcement is 
sought responsibility to act as a check on the court that ren-
dered the judgment.  Most obviously, the enforcing court cannot 
enforce judgments predicated on prohibited bases of jurisdic-
tion.  In addition, the enforcing court must verify that the de-
fendant received notice of the original action; in cases where the 
jurisdictional predicate is a general appearance, it must also 
verify that the defendant indeed waived objections to personal 
jurisdiction; if the rendering court was chosen in a nonnegoti-
ated contract, the issue of reasonableness must be reviewed.  
Further, courts are to refuse to enforce judgments rendered in 
conflict with the Principles’ lis pendens provisions and with de-
cisions the court with supervisory authority makes on coopera-
tion or consolidation.  Thus, for example, if the first action was 
filed in France and that court decided to consolidate the world-
wide dispute in Germany, then decisions rendered by any court 
other than the German court should not be enforced.  Although 
this system of second-guessing may appear destabilizing of de-
cisions and is certainly contrary to practice in many places, it is 
intended to compensate for the lack of hierarchical supervision 
present in other adjudicatory systems.   
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Second, the Principles include features that recognize the 
special import of intellectual property values, and the impact of 
intellectual property rights on culture, health, and well-being. 
Thus, the court where enforcement is sought is given some au-
thority to vary remedies to conform the outcome to local needs.  
It can refuse to enforce noncompensatory awards unknown to 
its own law as well as awards that are grossly excessive when 
judged by domestic conditions.  It can also decline to order in-
junctive relief when safety, health or local cultural policies are 
at issue.  In addition, the Principles recognize a general, but 
circumscribed, exception for judgments contrary to local public 
policy. 
III. INVITING CONFLICTS 
As noted earlier, one of the main differences between the ALI 
Principles on the one hand, and other enforcement regimes and 
initiatives (full faith and credit, the Brussels Regulation, the 
Hague instruments, and the ALI Project on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments),  and one of their most in-
novative features, is the articulation of principles on applicable 
law.  Further, the project provides an impetus for courts to ap-
ply the principles by denying enforcement to judgments that are 
based on choices of law “manifestly inconsistent” with the rules 
set out.  
The inclusion of principles on applicable law may seem re-
markable at first blush.  Not only are conflicts rules missing 
from other enforcement regimes, they are also largely absent 
from the international intellectual property instruments cur-
rently in force.33  Bill Patry has suggested that the reason for 
their omissions may be that until recently, there were so few 
cases involving multistate contacts that courts were never pre-
  
 33. Admittedly, there are a few provisions of international intellectual 
property law that arguably have choice-of-law overtones.  Thus, the Nimmers 
have argued (unconvincingly) that national treatment provisions create choice 
of law rules on ownership.  See Patry, supra note 12, at 413.  Further, the 
Berne Convention refers to the “law of the country where protection is 
claimed.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–27.  However, 
it is not clear whether this means the country where infringement occurred or 
the country where the case is being litigated.  Accordingly, if this is a choice of 
law rule, it is one that is very poorly drafted. 
File: DreyfussMACRO.06.16.05..doc Created on: 6/16/2005 3:14 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:33 PM 
2005] WHY INVITE CONFLICTS? 839 
 
sented with a choice: “there was only the law of the forum.”34  
Alternatively, it may be that the paucity of global cases embed-
ded concepts of territoriality so deeply into intellectual property 
jurisprudence, it was rarely evident that choices were being 
made.35  However, as the prospect of international disputes has 
come to the fore, it has become increasingly clear that the situa-
tion has changed dramatically.36 
Thus, one of the reasons negotiations over a general conven-
tion at the Hague broke down was that Internet cases—
including especially cases involving transactions in intangible 
works—were beginning to proliferate.37  Consideration of how 
these disputes would fare under the Hague’s jurisdictional pro-
visions demonstrated that there would surely be cases of over-
lapping adjudicatory authority.  Further, it became clear that 
these overlaps would do more than draw litigants into tribunals 
far from their homes. When cases are litigated in far-flung fora, 
there is a real prospect that activity would be judged under law 
different (possibly unforeseeably different) from the law of the 
location at which the activity was conducted.38  For example, 
  
 34. Patry, supra note 12, at 385. 
 35. Indeed, in an early presentation of the ALI Principles to the Advisers, a 
prominent jurist argued that there was no need for choice of law rules because 
the territorial principle was so obviously applicable. 
 36. See generally MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT 
AND RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO LEX PROTECTIONIS (2003); Paul Edward 
Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership 
Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315 (2004).    
 37. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.); 
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Revell v. Lidov, 
317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 38. This danger is reflected in the following question: 
Regarding the Hague treaty and copyright and fair use on the Inter-
net, what national laws would apply if I download an article, data, 
music or software from a European web site, to my US based com-
puter, and make an unauthorized use, for teaching, reverse engineer-
ing, commentary, parody or some other use that would be fair use in 
the US, but possibly not fair use in Europe…Could I be sued in 
Europe for violating the European copyright laws?  Would a judg-
ment be collected against me in the USA? 
E-mail from James Love, Consumer Project on Technology, to Mary Streett, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://lists.essent 
ial.org/pipermail/info-policy-notes/2000q3/000024.html; Cherie Dawson, Note, 
Creating Borders on the Internet: Free Speech, the United States, and Interna-
tional Jurisdiction, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2004); Nathan Garnett, Com-
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U.S. software producers began to realize that foreign use of 
their programs could expose their reverse engineering activities 
to adjudication under bodies of law that do not recognize a fair 
use defense. 
Of course, one could hope that courts would use restraint 
when applying local law to foreign activity.  For example, in F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., the U.S. Supreme 
Court recently held that U.S. antitrust law cannot be inter-
preted to cover foreign harm suffered by foreign defendants.39  
Noting that the decision to apply law extraterritorially requires 
heightened sensitivity to comity interests, Justice Breyer stated 
that courts are responsible for making sure that “conflicting 
laws of different nations work together in harmony—a harmony 
particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent world.”40   
Unfortunately, not every case has a fact pattern similar to 
the one in Empagran.  In that case, it was assumed that foreign 
and domestic injuries were independent of one another.41  Inter-
national intellectual property cases are not always so easily 
teased apart.  When the behavior in one place is necessarily 
intertwined with activity in another, even the highest regard 
for comity will produce overlapping prescriptive authority.  As 
the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted in a case involving 
a transmission originating in Canada that was downloaded in 
the United States, “the answer lies in the making of interna-
tional or bilateral agreements, not in national courts straining 
to find some jurisdictional infirmity in either state.”42  The bot-
tom line is that without an international agreement, there are 
activities that will inevitably be subject to scrutiny under more 
than one body of law, leading to the possibility of unforeseen 
results, or even worse: to multiple liability;43 to exposure to 
judgments mandating inconsistent behavior; and to the imposi-
  
ment, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick: Will Australia’s Long Jurisdictional Reach 
Chill Internet Speech World-Wide, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 61, 68 (2004). 
 39. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004). 
 40. Id. at 2366. 
 41. Id. at 2363–72. 
 42. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Cana-
dian Ass’n. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 462 (Can.). 
 43. This was the specific problem in SOCAN.  See id. 
File: DreyfussMACRO.06.16.05..doc Created on: 6/16/2005 3:14 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:33 PM 
2005] WHY INVITE CONFLICTS? 841 
 
tion of one country’s cultural and industrial innovation policies 
on another sovereign state.44 
Nor is it always the case that restraint is the right answer.  
As noted earlier, there are patent claims that contemplate ac-
tivity in more than one location; unless the law of some nation 
is applied extraterritorially, these inventions could be practiced 
without ever incurring infringement liability.45  Furthermore, 
one way to deal with the messy problem of multi-jurisdictional 
infringements is to bring a single case in one jurisdiction and 
argue that its law should control activity occurring elsewhere.  
For example, there have been both copyright and trademark 
cases in which U.S. law has been applied to foreign activity on 
the theory that the extraterritorial activity affected U.S. mar-
kets.46  The result was only rough justice (since the law at the 
location of the activity was not consulted), but that may be bet-
ter than slow and expensive justice (for example, through suits 
in multiple locations). 
Extraterritorial applications of law have other advantages as 
well.  Thus, it has been forcefully argued that if the rights in 
each intellectual product were controlled by the law of a single 
jurisdiction, world-wide negotiations would be vastly facili-
tated.47  For instance, it would be far easier to draft a global li-
cense covering the use of a U.S. movie in all media if there were 
no need to be concerned with the differences between U.S. law 
on work for hire and foreign rules mandating employee owner-
  
 44. Cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (letting stand a French order that prohibited a U.S. 
Internet service provider from displaying Nazi materials on sites accessible in 
both France and the United States). 
    45.  See supra text accompanying note 14.  
 46. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998);  Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing Ltd., 843 F.2d 
67 (2d Cir. 1988) (copyright); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (trademark). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private Interna-
tional Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological Change, 273 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 322–48 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Comment, Extraterritoriality and 
Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (1997).  
For an aptly named piece, see Nathan R. Wollman, Maneuvering Through the 
Landmines of Multiterritorial Copyright Litigation: How to Avoid the Pre-
sumption Against Extraterritoriality When Attempting to Recover for the For-
eign Exploitation of U.S. Copyrighted Works, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 343 (2002).  
 47. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 12, at 427–34. 
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ship;48 with a German law that bars the transfer of rights in 
undiscovered media;49 or with France’s elaborate moral rights 
doctrine.50  Since facilitating such transactions would make in-
formation products more readily available, these arguments are 
not solely about the interests of rights holders and licensees.  In 
fact, they have strong public policy overtones as well. 
With these concerns in mind, this project has from its outset 
considered the issue of applicable law.  Initially, the problem 
was dealt with through the back door, by making a judgment 
unenforceable if the law chosen was “arbitrary or unreason-
able.”51  However, it quickly became evident that this formula-
tion would be unworkable.  Because there has been such a pau-
city of debate over choice of law rules in intellectual property 
cases, there is little shared understanding of what should count 
as a reasonable choice; if the issue remained open in the enforc-
ing court, there was sure to be extensive relitigation.  The cur-
rent version of the project therefore confronts the problem head-
on by including provisions on applicable law.   
Recent meetings of the Advisers have been partly devoted to 
working these rules out.  As of this writing, it is fair to say that 
the hardest question is deciding between traditional notions of 
territoriality (which might enhance the appeal of the Principles 
for conservatively minded jurists) and a uniformity approach 
that would associate a work with a single nation’s law (and 
break new ground in international intellectual property juris-
prudence).  As explained below, the Principles currently split 
the difference, depending on the practicalities of the situation; 
the relative advantages of adhering to, or departing from, tradi-
tion; and the national interests involved in the rule in issue. 
  
 48. The U.S. rule, found in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), is relatively rare among 
domestic copyright laws. 
 49. § 31(4) UrhG, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/Urh 
G.htm (1965 German Copyright Act). See generally Adolf Dietz, Germany, in 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (David Nimmer et al. eds., 
2004) § 4[3][a]. 
 50. Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, art. L. 121-1, available at http:// 
www.unesco.org/culture/copy/copyright/france/sommaire2.html (France’s In-
tellectual Property Code, as last amended by the Law of June 18, 2003). 
 51. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1072. 
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A. Existence, Infringement, and Scope of Rights and Remedies 
As the draft now stands, the approach to these issues is 
largely territorial.  For economic rights, this means that each of 
these matters is controlled by the law of each country in which 
an infringement occurs.  Thus, for example, French law would 
apply to patent infringements in France, but U.S. law would 
apply when the same work is infringed in the United States.  
As noted earlier, there was a strong temptation to apply the 
law of the country most connected to the work, no matter where 
infringement occurred, for example, to apply French law to all 
of these issues when a work is created in France by French 
domiciliaries.  Not only would this simplify transactions, it 
would also maximize each nation’s ability to encourage produc-
tion within its territory and protect its creative citizens in the 
manner each regards as most appropriate.  The decision to fol-
low the traditional territorial approach was based on several 
considerations.  This rule does the least damage to the ability of 
each state to influence the availability of intellectual products 
within its borders.  By mimicking the outcomes that would ob-
tain when litigation is pursued state-by-state (and each court 
uses its own state’s law), this approach is likely to make the 
Principles more readily accepted.  Furthermore, since states 
lack the capacity to alter foreign registrations, the uniformity 
approach would be difficult to apply to questions involving the 
validity of registered rights.  Of course, a mixed system that 
treats registered rights differently from other forms of intellec-
tual property rights could have been adopted.  However, it was 
thought that this would be problematic because many economi-
cally important works implicate multiple intellectual property 
regimes.  Computer games, for example, may include copyright-
protected animation and music, characters protected by rights 
of publicity, patented software, and marketing symbols that are 
protected by trademark law.52 
The Principles do, however, recognize several exceptions to 
territoriality.  First, for noneconomic rights, the applicable law 
is that of the territory in which the author is habitually resident 
at the time the harm occurred.  In a sense, this is a territorial 
  
 52. See e.g., Tom Loftus, Stars Seek More Control Over Video Games (Mar. 
12, 2004), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4223361. 
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rule because it stems from the perception that noneconomic 
harm occurs where the author is found. However, the result is 
that one nation’s law applies to all violations.  For instance, if a 
copyrighted work authored by a Frenchman were utilized, 
moral rights issues would be analyzed under French law, irre-
spective of whether the work was used in France or in the 
United States.53   
The other exceptions are more conventional departures from 
territoriality.  Where territorial law cannot be ascertained, the 
law of the forum applies.  More important, in cases where the 
dispute is closely connected to a particular law, or to a preexist-
ing legal relationship subject to another law, the applicable law 
will be that of the connection or relationship.  Further, when 
use of protected works spills over national borders, and the de-
cision is made to consolidate adjudication, applying every 
state’s law may become unduly burdensome.  In such cases, the 
court can choose to simplify the dispute by utilizing the laws 
most closely associated with the dispute.  The criteria for choos-
ing which laws will be applied include the locus of the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s activities.    
These exceptions may not be as great a departure from tradi-
tion as may first appear. Courts usually use their own forum’s 
law in the case of uncertainty.  In practice, parties facing multi-
ple infringements often forgo adjudication in countries that are 
not closely connected to their prime business activities and 
needs.54  Furthermore, it is not unknown for a plaintiff to sue a 
defendant in its largest market, hoping that a loss of that reve-
nue will put the defendant out of business everywhere.  In ef-
fect, the law of the largest market winds up controlling avail-
ability in all markets. 
The final departure from territoriality is for agreements in 
which the parties choose to submit all or part of their dispute to 
the law of a single national law.  As in other areas, the Princi-
  
 53. Traditional conflicts scholars would call this a rule of personality, see 
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.83 (4th ed. 2000).  
 54. See, e.g., C.F. (Jm.) 41/92, Qimron v. Shanks, 69(iii) P.M. 10 & C.A. 
2760/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817, discussed in David 
Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2001); Neil Wilkof, Copyright, Moral Rights and the 
Choice of Law: Where Did the Dead Sea Scrolls Court Go Wrong?, 38 HOUS. L. 
REV. 463, 467 (2001).  
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ples favor party autonomy, but nonetheless circumscribe it in a 
variety of ways.  First, the validity and maintenance of regis-
tered rights, the existence, scope and duration of rights, and the 
formal requirements for recordation cannot be varied contrac-
tually.  Nonnegotiated agreements are subject to the usual 
scrutiny for reasonableness.  Finally, these agreements cannot 
be enforced if to do so would affect the rights of third parties. 
B. Initial Ownership 
In this area, the decision has been made to adopt the uni-
formity approach as much as possible because assigning a sin-
gle owner to world-wide rights greatly simplifies negotiations.  
Thus, the law that is applicable to ownership of rights created 
pursuant to a contract or preexisting relationship is that of the 
contract or relationship.  In most other cases, the law chosen is 
that of the creator’s residence at the time of the work’s creation.  
Where the law thus designated does not provide a solution, ini-
tial title is determined by the law of the place where the work is 
first exploited.55 
Unfortunately, there are a few situations where the territo-
rial rule appears unavoidable.  For registered rights, the law of 
the country of regulation usually applies because regulation is 
controlled by local registries.  However, in cases where the work 
was created pursuant to a contractual relationship, the law that 
governs the relationship controls, on the theory that the parties 
can be required to petition the place of registration for a change 
in title if that is what the court orders them to do.  The territo-
rial approach is also used for unregistered trademark rights.  
These rights arise directly out of local understanding of the 
source of the goods and services to which the marketing sym-
bols are attached.  Thus, the law that appropriately controls 
these rights is the law of the country in which the symbol at 
issue is conveying marketing information.  
  
 55. For example, rights of publicity are not recognized in the United King-
dom.  If provisions were not made for cases in which the place of the creator’s 
residence does not supply a solution, then a U.S. advertiser could use images 
of Prince William without authorization.  Under the Principles, however, 
ownership of the right of publicity would be determined by the law of the 
United States if the images were first exploited there. 
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C. Transfer of Rights 
There are two issues that arise in connection with licenses 
and assignments.  The first is “transferability”: in some cases, 
intellectual property rights are inalienable or only partially 
alienable.  As a result, there is a question on whether the right 
can be transferred at all.  For rights that are transferable, the 
second issue is whether the parties took the steps necessary to 
effect the transfer.   
On the first issue, transferability, the Principles follow the 
territorial approach.  Thus, they provide that the transferability 
is controlled by the law of the state whose rights are at issue.  
For example, a global agreement that purports to transfer “all 
rights in all media” made before the discovery of DVDs is not 
effective to give the transferee rights to exploit the work on 
DVDs in Germany because (as noted above) German copyright 
bars transfers involving undiscovered media.  This is so even if 
the license is effective under German law to transfer rights in 
known media (film, for example).  The license will also operate 
to transfer DVD rights in the same work for exploitation in the 
United States. 
As to the question of the effectiveness of transfers, here the 
Principles depart from territoriality and rely on the law of the 
agreement.56  Most sophisticated parties will include a choice of 
law clause and this will be enforceable; in its absence, transfer 
will be judged under the law of the country most closely con-
nected to the work, presumptively, the assignor’s or licensor’s 
habitual residence.  As usual, nonnegotiated agreements (other 
than collective bargaining agreements) are to be scrutinized for 
reasonableness. 
  
 56. Transfer issues may not raise significant domestic policy concerns, see, 
e.g., Univ. of Mass. v. Robl, 2004 WL 1725418 Mass. Dist. Ct. (Aug. 2, 2004) 
(issue of ownership of patent rights allocated contractually does not raise a 
federal question).  Note, however, that there is a lurking question on the law 
to be applied to characterizing a particular dispute as involving transferability 
or effective transfer. 
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D. Other Issues 
There are at least two additional issues that call for further 
examination.  The first is the use of mandatory rules.57  Al-
though unfamiliar to Americans, these rules are similar to pub-
lic policy defenses to enforcement in that they operate as 
trumps. However, unlike public policy decisions, they apply ab 
initio—they go to the question of which law is used to adjudi-
cate the case, and not to determine whether the outcome is ac-
ceptable in the place where enforcement is sought.  Initially, 
some thought was given to barring the use of mandatory rules.  
However, in places that recognize them, the bar would require a 
departure from traditional practice and is thus not likely to be 
acceptable.  Besides, the core territoriality principle may avoid 
much of the controversy because it always permits a state to 
apply its mandatory law to local infringements.  If experience 
with the Principles leads to greater appreciation of the interests 
of other countries, the wisdom of their approaches, and the 
benefits of comity, then the extraterritorial application of man-
datory rules will abate of its own accord. 
The second under-developed issue is secondary liability.  In 
the last few years, rights holders have begun to sue those who 
facilitate distribution of intellectual products, claiming that 
they are vicariously or contributorily liable for the infringe-
ments of users.58 As it stands, the Principles do not break this 
issue out for special treatment.  The theory is that since there 
cannot be secondary liability without primary liability, the law 
that governs primary liability should control.  However, this 
rationale only goes part way to solving the problem, for once 
there is infringement, jurisdictions differ on the terms on which 
  
 57. See, e.g., CA Paris, 43 ch., 6 July 1989, R.I.D.A. 1990, no. 143, 329, note 
Françon, Clunet 1989; CA Versailles, chs. réunies, 19 Dec. 1994, R.I.D.A. 
1995, no. 164, 389, note André Kéréver. 
 58. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2002): Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 
(9th Cir.), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); Kazaa Wins Dutch Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003 at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/technology/ 
20suit.html?ex=1092196800&en=6a5d023b09dbe00e&ei=5070.  Australia is 
about to grapple with the same issue; see Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. 
v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., (2004) FCA 183 (Federal Court of Austra-
lia); Australian Court Sets November Trial Date for Kazaa, 9 (BNA) 
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 625 (July 14, 2004). 
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they impose liability on third parties.59  Of course, there is rea-
son to think that part of the attraction of secondary liability 
actions is that they centralize litigation in one forum, thus 
eliminating the need to sue individual users in each of the coun-
tries where they are located.  This project may render some of 
these secondary liability suits unnecessary in that the Princi-
ples envision joinder of individual users in a single action, or—
at the least—coordination of separate suits against them. 
CONCLUSION 
The Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes are intended to take up 
Justice Breyer’s hope that “nations work together in [the] har-
mony ...  needed in today’s highly interdependent world.”  They 
recognize, however, that in many cases, courts cannot always 
assume interdependency away or cope with it on a unilateral 
basis.  More is required, from the parties involved in interstate 
transactions, from the courts dealing with multinational dis-
putes, and from interdependent nations themselves.   
Although considerable work has gone into the drafting of 
these Principles, it is important to emphasize that the project is 
far from over.  There are two lessons to be learned from the 
Hague’s experience with a general convention on enforcing for-
eign judgments.  The first is that input from all segments of the 
domestic and international bar is critical.  The problems facing 
copyright, trademark, and patent holders are all somewhat dif-
ferent, as are the issues encountered in different parts of the 
world.  The multinational composition of the Principles’ Report-
ers and Advisers is an effort to consider these divergent view-
points.  The second lesson is that we are only beginning to fully 
appreciate the issues posed by a truly global marketplace.  As 
the issues arising in an integrated economy are better under-
stood, so too are the issues of an integrated system of dispute 
resolution. The hope is that this effort will be a model for adop-
tion.  But if it only serves as a starting point for debate, it will 
have served an important purpose. 
 
  
 59. For example, the rule set out in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 380 
F.3d 1154 (2004), differs from that set out in In re Aimster Litigation, 334 
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
